Dramatis personae

  • Ms M (aka R1, MR), a prostitute and barrister and solicitor of the High Court, with a very unique connection to the New Zealand legal system (the identifying details are cunningly suppressed by courts)
  • Mr N (aka R2, NR).

    …although [Mr N] is self-represented, he is a professional man who is clearly highly intelligent. Perhaps not surprisingly, [Mr N]’s grasp of the relevant factual material exceeds that which would be expected of most counsel. In addition, he appears to have developed significant expertise in relation to both procedural and substantive legal matters in the course of pursuing his various proceedings.

  • Jackson Russell, R K M Hawk, S P Fitchett, former (until Feb-2012) lawyers of Ms M
  • Wilson Harle, C Browne, solicitors of Ms M
  • A J B Holmes, counsel for Ms M
  • R J Hollyman, counsel for Ms M, a teacher of advanced torts at Auckland University
  • New Zealand Judges and Honourable Justices

Chart of proceedings

DC FAM 2012-004-1564
Application for a protection order
(rejected by the Registrar)

CIV 2012-004-1034
Application for a restraining order
(Sharp DCJ)
CIV 2012-004-1388
Claim in defamation, breach of contract etc.
(Gibson DCJ)
CIV 2012-404-6851
Judicial review
CIV 2013-404-2702
CIV 2013-404-3172
Appeal of costs

(Justice Duffy)

CIV 2013-404-4701
Appeal of strikeout
(Andrews J)
CIV 2013-404-5195
Judicial review of costs
(Katz J)
CIV 2013-404-75
Contempt application
(Woodhouse J)
CA CA461/2014
(Wild J – review)
Appeal of non-recusal
Appeal of costs
Appeal of non-recusal
Application for leave to appeal
Appeal of strikeout
(Harrison J – directions)
(Harrison, Goddard, Cooper JJ)
Appeal of review
Appeal of directions
CA COA: Interlocutory matters
CA144/2014, CA443/2014, CA460/2014, CA461/2014, CA465/2014, CA522/2014 and CA532/2014
Procedural directions of Wild J;
Interlocutory application for debarring and disclosure (3-Oct-14)
(French, Miller, Cooper JJ)
SC SC3/2015
Appeal of dismissal of the interlocutory application
SC SC: Interlocutory matters
SC77/2014, SC120/2014, SC125/2014 and SC3/2015
Interlocutory application for debarring and disclosure (1-Dec-14)
(McGrath, William Young, Glazebrook JJ);
Interlocutory applications for recall, stay etc (12-Jan-15)

Summary in Images

“I will absolutely crucify the fʊcker in civil court”
Ms M’s intimations on the day she commenced the litigation (15-May-12) Mr N’s email to Ms M, ten days earlier
Hi Rachel, I thought I would forward to you the affidavit I filed today. My lawyer is trying to get me in under a protection order which requires a domestic relationship - this means the order will be served without notice. However, its a bit of a stretch so it is more likely that it will fall under the Harrassment act, which gives him a chance to defend the order before it is made… me. Also, he cannot claim for damages for civil tortius acts in the Disputes Tribunal - he would have to go to the district court or high court. This is extremely expensive, and if he does I will either apply for the proceedings to be struck out (which they will be immeadiately) or counter claim and absolutely crucify the f.cker in civil court. He is by no means a high roller, and his wife has [redacted] so Im pretty sure… Dear C, I hope you are doing well. I am sorry to say that you left me no choice but to contact you directly. I would very much prefer to speak to you in person, but I don't think you'd appreciate me knocking to your door. I could forgive you for grossly abusing me and causing the loss of $1,000 for no reason. Unfortunately, you added insult to injury by referring me to our mutual friend, who couldn't have thought of anything better than threatening me and my family. That's what I'd call “crossing the line” (you know what I mean!), and I so didn't deserve it. The only reason I haven't taken a legal action yet is that I don't want to hurt you. But it's beyond my control to simply forget the matter either. I would like to talk it over with you in person. I believe that thirty minutes or so in a public place of your choice would be enough to settle the matter, so that we could finally forget each other. Please give me a phone call during business hours, or let me know if and when I can call you to schedule the meeting. If you don't call me by Friday, I will attempt to contact you in person because I cannot rely on email in this matter.
Certificate of Ms Fitchett from Jackson Russell under Ms M’s application for a protection order against Ms M Letter of the Deputy Registrar on the outcome of Ms M’s application (demonstrates the worthiness of Ms Fitchett’s certificate)
I, [Ms M] apply without notice for a Protection Order against [Mr N] the Respondent… Certificate of Lawyer. I certify that:… (c) I am satisfied: (i) that the Application and every affidavit comply with the requirements of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 and the Family Court Rules 2002; and (ii) that the order sought ought to be made (or that the orders sought are orders that ought to be made. [Ms Fitchett of Jackson Russell] Counsel for Applicant. 15 May 2012 Dear Sir, Re: [Redacted] v [Redacted], I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 26th January 2013. An application for protection order was made in court on 15th May 2012, but was returned to the applicant's lawyer as it did not fit the criteria for Protection Order… Yours faithfully, Tariq Aziz, Team Leader, Civil and Family Services
“This entire proceeding has potential to spiral out of control in a spectacular way”
Mr N’s application for contempt orders against Ms M and Jackson Russell Minute of Priestley J
14. The grounds on which the order specified in para 1(g) above is sought are as follows: (a) On 15 May 2012, the Fourth Respondent signed a certificate accompanying Ms M’s application without notice for protection order filed in FAM 2012-004-1564 on 15 May 2012 in the Family Court at Auckland. The certificate was required by r 26(1) of the Domestic Violence Rules 1996 and r 308(2) of the Family Courts Rules 2002. The Fourth Respondent wilfully or recklessly signed the certificate even though the application for a protection order and the affidavit filed with it did not comply with the requirements of the Act and the court rules, and the orders sought in the application were not ones that ought to be made, as follows: [1] This entire proceeding has potential to spiral out of control in a spectacular way and bring nothing but delay, expense, and misery to all its parties. [2] That said the applicant, Mr N, is entitled to his day in court. Certainly Mr N has been meticulous and focused in the way he has drawn his pleadings and made his submissions today.
“No legitimate grounds have been raised”
Mr N’s application for recall of a judgment of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court judgment on Mr N’s application
Appendix A. Grounds for recall or rescindment. Legal principles. A1. The application for recall of is based on the second and third categories for recall recognised by the New Zealand courts: Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 (SC):… A3. In terms of the second category for recall, counsel failed to direct the Supreme Court’s attention to the case law mentioned in para A24-A27 below. A4. In terms of the third category for recall, I rely on the following “very special reasons”: (a) The Supreme Court was apparently or actually biased against me. This is a recognized ground for recall: Man O'War Station Limited v Auckland City Council (No 1) [2002] NZPC 6; SAXMERE COMPANY LIMITED AND ORS V WOOL BOARD DISESTABLISHMENT COMPANY LIMITED [2009] NZSC 72. (b) In case if the ground of bias is not made out, the Supreme Court otherwise denied natural justice to me (inter alia, breached the audi alteram partem  principle). A refusal of the Supreme Court to consider the allegation of denial of natural justice or to recall the judgment in case if the allegation is proved would constitute an unremedied defect in the administration of justice, which would inevitably adversely affect public confidence in the administration of justice: Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design and Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55 at [117]. This amounts to a “very special reason” given the absence of the right to appeal as the injustice was committed by the highest New Zealand court. (c) The Supreme Court failed to determine issues that were properly put to it and/or misapprehended my submissions. This is a recognized ground for recall: BELL v BDO SPICERS MANAWATU LIMITED [2013] NZHC 1287 at [16](a). These “very special reasons” are particularised below. Recall application. [18] In our judgment of 19 December 2014 we dismissed Mr N’s interlocutory application seeking an order of this Court directing disclosure of litigation funding arrangements and debarring the lawyers for Ms M from acting. These applications were made with regard to three of Mr N’s current applications for leave to appeal: SC 77/2014, SC 120/2014 and SC 125/2014. [19] In an application dated 12 January 2015, Mr N brings the same application but in respect of SC 5/2013 (and adds Mr Latimour to the list of counsel he seeks to disbar). In the same application Mr N has applied to this Court to recall this Court’s 19 December 2014 judgment. Mr N wishes to renew his interlocutory applications for debarment and disclosure for applications SC 120/2014 and SC 125/2014 and amend them to include Mr Latimour. [20] No legitimate grounds have been raised for the recall of our 19 December 2014 judgment. The remainder of the 12 January 2015 application is duplicitous and an abuse of process.